Analysis of Knowledge Management Models

Analysis of Knowledge Management Models Introduction Knowledge management is a critical aspect that is greatly considered by individuals working in organisations and whose roles mainly entail the gathering of information, documents, as well as professional experiences and general understanding at the corporate level.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Analysis of Knowledge Management Models specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Nonaka and Takeuchi have contributed immensely towards the understanding of this area, providing contributions to help in the understanding of the dynamic character of knowledge creation together with the management of related processes effectively (Glisby Holden, 2003, p. 29). The particular models by these gurus involve a combination of a continuous process that eventually leads to knowledge creation. This paper seeks to evaluate the two models proposed by the two experts, the SECI model and the â€Å"Ba† model, also known as the Shared Context of Knowledge Creation model (Choo Neto, 2010, p. 592). The evaluation is done mainly by critiquing, comparing, and drawing contrasts of the models. The paper also highlights a realistic example about how one of the models is implemented in the industry for the purposes of knowledge management. The SECI Model The SECI model, which means Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination, and Internationalisation, was proposed jointly by Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirakata Takeuvuchi. It suggests that knowledge is created through four significant steps of sharing and creating, articulation, systemising and applying, as well as learning and acquiring (Li Gao, 2003, p. 6). Thus, according to this model, the sharing and creation of tacit or unstated knowledge occurs by direct experience. People gain knowledge from each other as they socialise or interact directly. The externalisation or articulation of the tacit knowledge occurs by way of dialogue, as well as reflection. As people comm unicate with each other, their tacit knowledge is comprehended by others. In this case, their tacit knowledge transforms into what is regarded as explicit or unambiguous knowledge (Nonaka, Toyama, 2003, p. 2).Advertising Looking for essay on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More On the other hand, combination occurs after externalisation, where outside information and knowledge are combined in a systematic way before being applied in the organisation. Finally, the internalisation stage refers to the actual learning. In other words, it means that the knowledge already acquired is being transformed into plain knowledge (Bratianu Orzea, 2010, p. 41). Nonaka’s idea of categorising knowledge as either tacit or explicit equally contributes towards explaining the effectiveness of the SECI model further. In a bid to differentiate between the two, Nonaka speaks about tacit knowledge as being highly per sonal and difficult to personalise. Therefore, inasmuch as tacit knowledge may remain contained in an individual’s brain, it is very difficult for the person to share or describe it to others (Song, Uhm, Yoon, 2011, p. 243). He, on the other hand, describes explicit knowledge as representing the rational content of an individual’s knowledge. Unlike tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge is easily explainable and expressible. The actual conversion of knowledge from tacit to explicit is what creates organisational knowledge. Criticism Nonaka only ends up blurring the distinction between groups and individuals by assuming that knowledge dynamics are explainable in four basic processes, including socialisation, externalisation, together with combination and internalisation. Converting knowledge from tacit to explicit form is a process that takes place within an individual, at least according to epistemology. In other words, Nonaka’s explanation to the effect that the process is developed between a particular person’s tacit knowledge and another’s explicit knowledge is meaningless. It is only possible for knowledge conversion to occur either from tacit to tacit or explicit to explicit between two individuals (Bratianu, 2010, p. 195). If the model’s explanation would consider only two people, then it would be more understandable. However, as per the model’s explanation, it appears Nonaka is also considering groups or teams in the organisation in his explanation, thereby making it difficult to demonstrate or explain the concept. As Bratianu (2010, p. 195) points out, the main challenge here is the sequential interplay that exists between group processes, on the one hand, and the strictly individual processes, on the other hand.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Analysis of Knowledge Management Models specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More According to Bereiter ( 2002, p. 176), the SECI model bases its ideas and general foundation on folk epistemology, which considers individual minds as having unformed knowledge. Thus, according to Nonaka, this unformed knowledge needs to be projected into the external world. However, in the real sense, this approach as seems to be suggested by Nonaka hinders any endeavour to offer a model or theory about knowledge creation. Bereiter (2002, p. 176), therefore, argues strongly against the theory, particularly owing to its failure to be relied upon in business as a theory, as well as a practical concept. From a personal standpoint, having considered Nonaka’s proposal regarding knowledge conversion, it is evident that it misses a point on practicality in the real sense. For instance, he argues that knowledge conversion starts with socialisation; that is, tacit acquirement of unstated knowledge of individuals who lack it from those who have it (Holden Von Kortzfleisch, 2004, p. 127). Conversely, there i s the practicality of the knowledge that is possessed by individuals in a firm. This knowledge is ingrained in the individuals’ bodies. It is involved in a certain environment. In essence, it is unrealistic to state when individuals are asked to illustrate how they undertake their activities. It is often difficult for anybody to suggest or explain it in words. Another setback in the SECI prototype is that it does not encompass cultural issues. Nonaka has failed to discuss the manner in which knowledge conversion can be undertaken in a team or an organisation with cultural diversity in detail. It is prudent to point out that very few organisations in today’s world have homogeneity. Many organisations are including people drawn from different backgrounds and cultures and based on their experience and education to achieve a competitive edge in a world that is highly competitive (Holden Von Kortzfleisch, 2004). The â€Å"Ba† Model (Shared Context of Knowledge Creat ion) Professor Nonaka further developed the ‘Ba† model, which was initially proposed by other philosophers from Japan. This theory is founded on the thought that ba is a shared space that offers knowledge creation foundation (Nonaka, Toyama, Byosiere, 2001, p. 499). The shared space in this scenario could mean an office, a virtual platform such as an email or teleconferencing, as well as mental aspects such as ideas and experiences. It could also extend to imply a combination of the two aspects.Advertising Looking for essay on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More There are 4 types of â€Å"Ba† that are synonymous to the 4 aspects that form the SECI model. Collectively, the four types of ba provide a basis upon which particular steps can take place within the process of knowledge spiral. Every â€Å"ba† is meant to oversee a given conversion process. This, eventually, accelerates the process of formulating knowledge. Nonaka’s proposal of the four Ba’s includes the originating Ba, Interacting Ba, Cyber Ba, as well as Exercising Ba. Criticism According to their definition of Ba, Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere (2001, p. 499) consider it as a perspective whereupon the sharing of knowledge occurs. Further, they also consider it as a perspective for creating and putting the information into use, with the main basis of the model being the fact that knowledge has to rely on a context for it to exist. However, this definition contradicts the whole idea of the model’s description because it suggests that the knowledge b eing referenced relates strongly to a particular cultural context, as well as a given material. It goes beyond the consideration of knowledge being a personal belief as has been proposed earlier on. The argument that a person’s knowledge can be shared is a source of criticism against the model. This mainly happens in the case where one is involved in Ba. Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere (2001, p. 499) create an even bigger ambiguity when they refer to Ba as an interface, implying that Ba is no longer a physical space as had been suggested earlier. It also does not refer anymore to people having knowledge. Instead, the description portrays it as knowledge in its own standing. Comparison of SECI and â€Å"Ba† Models Both SECI and ‘Ba’ models suggest four aspects that correspond to each other. The Socialisation in SECI model is represented by the Originating ‘Ba’, which implies love, emerging care, commitment, and trust. The second mode in SECI model , Externalisation, is represented by the Interacting ‘Ba’ in the Ba model. It reflects the sharing of, as well as being aware of the mental models of an individual. It also takes into account the extensive dialogue occurring between peers and the extensive application of metaphors for purposes of enhancing understanding (Magnier-Watanabe, Benton Senoo, 2011, p. 17). The third mode in SECI, Correspondence, reflects on â€Å"Ba’s† third aspect referred to as Cyber ‘Ba†. This takes into consideration the interaction place in the virtual world rather than real space with time (Bernius, 2010, p. 583). Finally, the fourth mode as proposed in the SECI model, Internalisation, reflects on the Exercising ‘Ba’ aspect in the Ba model. This is the concept of supporting and changing explicit knowledge to knowledge that is tacit in nature. It depends upon the use of action during learning. Contrasting the Two Models Both models proposed by Nonak a and Takeuchi describe combination and internalisation as comprising of several activities that are, nonetheless, distinct. In particular, two activities of reading and writing make up both processes. These activities are disparate and not clearly understood in terms of what makes them be considered as internalisation or a combination. Nonaka and Takeuchi do not make their principle clear, even through suggested examples (Magnier-Watanabe, Benton Senoo, 2011, p. 20). This overly implies deficiency in conceptual clarity. In the SECI model, the argument upheld by the two proponents is that tacit knowledge forms the basis of any new knowledge. However, what the models fail to explain clearly is the fact that knowledge conversion ought to start from socialisation. Further, the argument suggests that tacit knowledge also comes about as a result of internalisation (Nonaka Toyama, 2003, p. 2). From this point of view, it can be argued that knowledge creation may also result from creativ e production of explicit knowledge given that reading and writing form a critical aspect of tacit knowledge formation. This is also referred to as ‘combination’, according to the two models. Basing on the same argument, externalisation could equally form part of a starting point because all that is needed is what is known as ‘source’ activity or the associated tacit knowledge, which is already in existence. It is critical to point out that Nonaka evidently proposed only two approaches through which knowledge is converted. These are tacit to explicit mode and explicit to tacit mode (Nonaka Toyama, 2003, p. 2). Socialisation deals with how people obtain knowledge that is tacit in nature. On the other hand, combination is the aspect of impacting knowledge that is explicit in nature. The containers in this case could either be people, computers, or documents. The challenges that have been enumerated about the models are an indicator of a more serious problem i n the conceptual model proposed by Nonaka. Application of SECI Model in the Industry One of the most significant incidents highlighting the application of the SECI model in the industry reflects on the performance of Apple Inc, which today is regarded as one of the best and leading IT companies in the world. In particular, Apple owes its growth and successful business practices to the tacit knowledge of its former chief executive officer, the late Steve Jobs (Buono Poulfeit, 2005, p. 314). Virtually all the product ideas from Apple Inc. that today reign in the IT market, such as the iPod and iPhone, were propped up by Jobs ahead of other rival firms in the IT industry. Although he was in the top management of the firm, Steve Jobs shared his tacit knowledge with the rest of the company’s staff, including fellow managers and engineers, to turn his mental ideas into real products. As Nonaka, Reimoeller, and Senoo (2000, p. 90) point out, tacit knowledge is not measurable, but i t depends mainly on an individual’s experience gained over time. Jobs had both tacit and explicit knowledge, having rejoined Apple as a manager after several years of working in different IT projects. The externalisation of the tacit knowledge contained in Jobs brain mainly occurred through the brainstorming meetings that he attended with the rest of his colleagues in the firm. Jobs is also renowned for having authored his numerous experiences that were read and shared amongst the members of the organisation (Buono Poulfeit, 2005, p. 314). Conclusion Nonaka and Takeuchi have provided immense breakthrough in the area of organisational knowledge management through their proposed models. The SECI model comprises of four modes, which Nonaka explains as critical in managing knowledge. They include socialisation between individuals with knowledge and those lacking it, externalisation, combination, and internalisation. The knowledge management model also introduces two definitions of knowledge; tacit and explicit knowledge. The former refers to knowledge or ideas that are contained in one’s brain, but which are immeasurable. On the other hand, explicit knowledge is measurable and can be explained by an individual. Another model suggested by the gurus is known as the â€Å"Ba† model, or the Shared Context of Knowledge Creation model. Like the SECI model, it also comprises of four aspects that Nonaka describes as originating Ba, Interacting Ba, Cyber Ba, as well as Exercising Ba. The four Ba’s correspond to SECI’s Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination, and Internalisation respectively. Apple Inc. is one of the firms that highlight the application of the SECI model explicitly. Under Steve Jobs as its manager, Apple made significant business strides because of the tacit and explicit knowledge that he brought with him on board. List of References Bereiter, C 2002, Education and mind in the knowledge age, Erlbaum, London Bernius, S 2010, ‘The impact of open access on the management of scientific knowledge’, Online Information Review, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 583-603. Bratianu, C 2010, ‘A critical analysis of Nonakas model of knowledge dynamics’, Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 193-200. Bratianu, C, Orzea, I 2010, ‘Organizational knowledge creation’, Management Marketing, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 41-62. Buono, AF Poulfeit, F 2005, Challenges and issues in knowledge management, Information Age Publishing, New York, NY Choo, CW, Neto, RCDA, 2010, ‘Beyond the Ba: managing enabling contexts in knowledge organizations’, Journal of Knowledge Management, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 592-610. Glisby, M, Holden, N. 2003, ‘Contextual constraints in knowledge management theory: the cultural embeddedness of Nonakas knowledge-creating company’, Knowledge and Process Management, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 29-36. Holden, NJ, Von Kortzfleisch, HFO 2004 , ‘Why cross-cultural knowledge transfer is a form of translation in more ways than you think’, Knowledge and Process Management, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 127-137 Li, M, Gao, F 2003, ‘Why Nonaka highlights tacit knowledge: A critical review’, Journal of Knowledge Management, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 6-14. Magnier-watanabe, R, Benton, C, Senoo, D 2011, ‘A study of knowledge management enablers across countries’, Knowledge Management Research Practice, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 17-28. Nonaka, I, Toyama, R 2003, ‘The knowledge-creating theory revisited: knowledge creation as a synthesizing process’, Knowledge Management Research Practice, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 2-10. Nonaka, I, Reimoller, P, Senoo, D, 2000, â€Å"Integrated IT systems to capitalize on market knowledge†, In Krogh G, Nonaka I, Nishiguchi T (eds.), Knowledge creation: A source of value, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 89–109. Nonaka, I, Toyama, R, Byosiere, PH 2001, â⠂¬Å"A theory of organizational knowledge creation: understanding the dynamic process of creating knowledge†, In Dierkes, M, Antal, AB, Child, J, Nonaka, I (eds.), Handbook of organizational learning and knowledge, pp.487-491, Oxford University Press, Oxford Nonaka, T, Toyama, R, Nagata, A 2000, ‘A firm as a knowledge creating entity: a new perspective on the theory of the firm’, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 9 pp. 1-20. Song, JH, Uhm, D, Yoon, SW 2011, ‘Organizational knowledge creation practice’, Leadership Organization Development Journal, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 243-259.

Battle of Island Number 10 in the Civil War

Battle of Island Number 10 in the Civil War Battle of Island Number 10 - Conflict Dates: The Battle of Island Number 10 was fought February 28 to April 8, 1862, during the American Civil War (1861-1865). Armies Commanders Union Brigadier General John PopeFlag Officer Andrew Foote6 gunboats, 11 mortar raftsapprox. 20,000 men Confederates Brigadier General John P. McCownBrigadier General William Mackallapprox. 7,000 men Battle of Island Number 10 - Background: With the beginning of the Civil War, Confederate forces began making efforts to fortify key points along the Mississippi River to prevent Union attacks south. One area that received attention was the New Madrid Bend (near New Madrid, MO) which featured two 180-degree turns in the river. Located at the base of the first turn when steaming south, Island Number Ten dominated the river and any vessels attempting to pass would fall under its guns for protracted period. Work commenced on fortifications on the island and adjacent land in August 1861 under the direction of Captain Asa Gray. The first to be completed was Battery No. 1 on the Tennessee shoreline. Also known as the Redan Battery, it had a clear field of fire upstream but its position on low ground made it subject to frequent flooding. Work at Island Number Ten slowed in the fall of 1861 as resources and focus shifted north to the fortifications under construction at Columbus, KY. In early 1862, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant captured Forts Henry and Donelson on the nearby Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. As Union troops pressed towards Nashville, the Confederate forces at Columbus came under threat of being isolated. To prevent their loss, General P.G.T. Beauregard ordered them to withdraw south to Island Number Ten. Arriving in late February, these forces began work to strengthen the areas defenses under the guidance of Brigadier General John P. McCown. Battle of Island Number Ten - Building the Defenses: Seeking to better secure the area, McCown commenced work on fortifications from the northern approaches to the first bend, past the island and New Madrid, and down to Point Pleasant, MO. Within a matter of weeks, McCowns men built five batteries on the Tennessee shore as well as five additional batteries on the island itself. Mounting a combined 43 guns, these positions were further supported by the 9-gun floating battery New Orleans which occupied a position at the western end of the island. At New Madrid, Fort Thompson (14 guns) rose west of the town while Fort Bankhead (7 guns) was built to the east overlooking the mouth of a nearby bayou. Aiding in the Confederate defense were six gunboats overseen by Flag Officer George N. Hollins (Map). Battle of Island Number Ten - Pope Approaches: As McCowns men worked to improve the defenses at the bends, Brigadier General John Pope moved to assemble his Army of the Mississippi at Commerce, MO. Directed to strike at Island Number Ten by Major General Henry W. Halleck, he moved out in late February and arrived near New Madrid on March 3. Lacking the heavy guns to assault the Confederate forts, Pope instead directed Colonel Joseph P. Plummer to occupy Point Pleasant to the south. Though forced to endure shelling from Hollins gunboats, Union troops secured and held the town. On March 12, heavy artillery arrived in Popes camp. Emplacing guns at Point Pleasant, Union forces drove off the Confederate vessels and closed the river to enemy traffic. The following day, Pope began shelling the Confederate positions around New Madrid. Not believing that the town could be held, McCown abandoned it on the night of March 13-14. While some troops moved south to Fort Pillow, the majority joined the defenders on Island Number Ten. Battle of Island Number Ten - The Siege Begins: Despite this failure, McCown received a promotion to major general and departed. Command at Island Number Ten then passed to Brigadier General William W. Mackall. Though Pope had taken New Madrid with ease, the island presented a more difficult challenge. The Confederate batteries on the Tennessee shore were flanked by impassable swamps to the east while the only land approach to the island was along a single road which ran south to Tiptonville, TN. The town itself was sited on a narrow spit of land between the river and Reelfoot Lake. To support operations against Island Number Ten, Pope received Flag Officer Andrew H. Footes Western Gunboat Flotilla as well as a number of mortar rafts. This force arrived above the New Madrid Bend on March 15. Unable to directly assault Island Number Ten, Pope and Foote debated how to reduce its defenses. While Pope desired Foote to run his gunboats past the batteries to cover a landing downstream, Foote had concerns about losing some of his vessels and preferred to commence a bombardment with his mortars. Deferring to Foote, Pope agreed to a bombardment and for the next two weeks the island came under a steady rain of mortar shells. As this action ensued, Union forces cut a shallow canal across the neck of the first bend which allowed transport and supply vessels to reach New Madrid while avoiding the Confederate batteries. With the bombardment proving ineffective, Pope again began to agitate for running some of the gunboats past Island Number Ten. While an initial council of war on March 20 saw Footes captains refuse this approach, a second nine days later resulted in Commander Henry Walke of USS Carondelet (14 guns) agreeing to attempt a passage. Battle of Island Number Ten - The Tide Turns: While Walke waited for a night with good conditions, Union troops led by Colonel George W. Roberts raided Battery No. 1 on the evening of April 1 and spiked its guns. The following night, the Footes flotilla focused its attention on New Orleans and succeeded in cutting the floating batterys mooring lines leading it to drift away downstream. On April 4, conditions proved correct and Carondelet began creeping past Island Number Ten with a coal barge lashed to its side for added protection. Pushing downstream, the Union ironclad was discovered but successfully ran through the Confederate batteries. Two nights later USS Pittsburg (14) made the voyage and joined Carondelet. With the two ironclads to protect his transports, Pope began plotting a landing on the east bank of the river. On April 7, Carondelet and Pittsburg eliminated the Confederate batteries at Watsons Landing clearing the way for Popes army to cross. As Union troops commenced landing, Mackall assessed his situation. Unable to see a way to hold Island Number Ten, he directed his troops to begin moving towards Tiptonville but left a small force on the island. Alerted to this, Pope raced to cut off the Confederates sole line of retreat. Slowed by fire from the Union gunboats, Mackalls men failed to reach Tiptonville before the enemy. Trapped by Popes superior force, he had no choice but to surrender his command on April 8. Pressing forward, Foote received the surrender of those still on Island Number Ten. Battle of Island Number Ten - Aftermath: In the fighting for Island Number Ten, Pope and Foote lost 23 killed, 50 wounded, and 5 missing while Confederate losses numbered around 30 killed and wounded as well as approximately 4,500 captured. The loss of Island Number Ten cleared the Mississippi River to further Union advances and later in the month Flag Officer David G. Farragut opened its southern terminus by capturing New Orleans. Though a key victory, the fighting for Island Number Ten was generally overlooked by the general public as the Battle of Shiloh was fought April 6-7. Selected Sources History of War: Battle of Island Number 10CWSAC Battle Summary: Battle of Island Number 10New Madrid: Battle of Island Number 10